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Abstract  In the housing markets three basic facts have been repeatedly reported by empirical studies: the 
existence of price dispersion, the positive correlation between housing price and time-on-the-market, and between 
housing price and trading volume. Since housing markets are characterised by a decentralised framework of 
exchange with important search and matching frictions, this paper examines whether the baseline search and 
matching model can account for these three basic facts. We find that the behaviour of the housing market reflected in 
the above empirical findings can be addressed by the standard matching framework. 
Keywords: Matching models, Time-on-the-market, Housing price dispersion, Trading volume 
1. Introduction 
Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised 
exchange framework with important search and matching 
frictions. It has, in fact, been acknowledged that housing 
markets clear not only through price but also through the 
time and money that a buyer and a seller spend on the 
market. Consequently, the search and matching approach 
is widely used even in the real estate market (see the next 
section). 
Furthermore, three basic facts have been repeatedly 
reported: (i) the positive correlation between housing price 
and time-on-the-market (see Leung, Leong and Chan, 
2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004, 
among others); 1  (ii) the positive correlation between 
housing price and trading volume (see Leung, Lau and 
Leong, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003, among others); (iii) the 
existence of price dispersion. Although price dispersion 
research is more commonly found in studies of non-
durable consumption goods (see Baye et al., 2006), price 
dispersion studies on durable and re-saleable goods such 
as real estate are also growing rapidly (for an overview see 
Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). Price dispersion (or price 
volatility) is probably the most important distinctive 
feature of housing markets. It refers to the phenomenon of 
selling two houses with very similar attributes and in near 
locations at the same time but at very different prices. In a 
nutshell, the variance in house prices cannot be attributed 
completely to the heterogeneous nature of real estate. 
Remaining price differentials are in fact empirically non 
negligible. A significant part of housing price dispersion is 
basically due to the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers, in 
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 The time-on-the-market, i.e. the time it takes to sell a property, 
measures the degree of illiquidity of the real estate asset and is a 
fundamental characteristic differentiating real estate from 
financial assets. 
particular their sustained search costs (see e.g. Leung and 
Zhang, 2011). Vukina and Zheng (2010) find very strong 
empirical support for the theoretical prediction that 
bargaining with search costs explains price dispersion in 
the agricultural market. 
The main aim of this paper is to show that the standard 
matching framework is able to explain the basic facts of 
housing markets without any significant deviation from 
the baseline model (Pissarides, 2000). Indeed, we develop 
a simple housing market matching model in which a seller 
can become a buyer and vice versa. Precisely, sellers are 
assumed to hold a number of houses equal to or higher 
than two; thus, when a seller (with two houses) manages 
to sell one house, s/he becomes a buyer, and when a buyer 
buys a second home, s/he becomes a seller. Hence, the 
proposed work takes the distinctive feature of the 
considered market into account, since buyers today are 
potential sellers tomorrow (Leung, Leong and Wong, 
2006), and most houses are bought by those who already 
own one, and most houses are sold by those wanting to 
buy another house (Janssen et al., 1994). In this model, 
price dispersion exists only assuming a different number 
of houses per capita. Also, this simple theoretical model is 
able to explain two other well-known empirical 
regularities, namely the positive correlation between 
housing price and time‐on‐the‐market, and between 
housing price and trading volume. Therefore, this paper 
shows that the behaviour of the housing market, reflected 
in the above empirical findings, can be addressed by the 
standard matching framework.2 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 
briefly reviews the literature which makes use of matching 
models to study the housing market; section 3 presents the 
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 Although this approach is commonly used in the labour market, 
Wasmer and Weil (2004) show that it can also be used to 
describe matching difficulties between financial backers (banks) 
and firms. 
housing market matching model; while section 4 
concludes the work. 
2. Literature review 
This paper belongs to the recent and growing literature 
that uses search and matching models to explain the 
behaviour of housing markets. The first search model of 
the housing market is Wheaton’s (1990). Since then, 
several papers have developed models to analyse the 
formation process of prices in housing markets with 
search/matching/trading frictions (Krainer, 2001; Albrecht 
et al., 2007, 2009; Caplin and Leahy, 2008; Novy-Marx, 
2009; Ngai and Tenreyro, 2009; Diaz and Jerez, 2009; 
Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; 
Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). 
Furthermore, recent search and matching models of the 
housing market (Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; 
Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; 
Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012) adopt an 
aggregate matching function and some of them also focus 
on the role of market tightness in determining the 
probability of matching between the parties. This is in line 
with the standard matching approach (see Pissarides, 
2000). The main difference between our model and those 
in the quoted studies is that we closely track the standard 
matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides without 
any significant deviation from the baseline model. For 
example, Diaz and Jerez (2009), Novy-Marx (2009), 
Genesove and Han (2010), Leung and Zhang (2011), and 
Peterson (2012) define the market tightness from a buyer 
perspective, i.e. housing market tightness is the ratio of 
buyers to sellers. Instead, we prefer to use the standard 
definition of tightness, thus considering the ratio of vacant 
houses to home seekers (the buyers). In the labour market, 
in fact, tightness is the ratio of job vacancies to job 
seekers. Also, the assumption about the number of houses 
held by sellers is the only deviation from the baseline 
matching model, since it allows us to take into account the 
distinctive feature of housing market, i.e. the transition 
from seller to buyer and vice versa. 
Among this literature, our model is most related to the 
competitive search framework developed by Leung and 
Zhang (2011), since it aims to explain the three basic facts 
of the housing market. In Leung and Zhang (2011), a 
necessary condition for explaining the housing market 
facts is the heterogeneity on the seller's and/or the buyer's 
side, which generates corresponding submarkets. 
Precisely, Leung and Zhang (2011) focus on one-side 
heterogeneity and assume that sellers are different in terms 
of their waiting costs for selling the house, where buyers 
are free to enter either submarket. In their model the 
reservation value of a buyer is exogenous and sellers 
commit to stay in one of the submarkets.3 Unlike Leung 
and Zhang (2011), we develop a matching model which is 
consistent with both a single housing market and different 
search-housing markets with heterogeneous fundamentals. 
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 Sellers with higher waiting costs (the so-called impatient or 
"fire-sale" sellers) are willing to accept lower prices, which 
attract a larger number of buyers so that the house can be sold 
faster. However, patient sellers (sellers with lower waiting costs) 
may find it profitable to enter that sub-market. 
Furthermore, in our model the free-entry or zero-profit 
condition for sellers à la Pissarides, rather than the buyer's 
free entry assumption used by Leung and Zhang (2011), 
allows to obtain a solution which characterises the direct 
relationship between market tightness and house price.4 
The free-entry condition for sellers is also used by 
Albrecht et al. (2009) to endogenise housing market 
tightness. Nevertheless, in their model, search is directed 
rather than random, houses are sold by auction rather than 
by bargaining and sellers post prices to attract buyers. 
3. A Matching Model of Housing Market 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) with 
random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. 
The random matching assumption is absolutely 
compatible with a market where the formal distinction 
between the demand and supply side is very subtle; 
whereas, bargaining is a natural outcome of decentralised 
markets for heterogeneous goods. 
The economy is populated by buyers (b) and sellers (s) 
who hold a certain number of homes (h). Precisely, sellers 
hold h>1 houses of which h – 1 are on the market: hence, 
vacancies (v) are simply given by v = (h – 1)·s. Instead, 
buyers expend costly search effort to find a new or better 
house: in fact, they already hold a house, i.e. h=1, and 
there are no homeless persons, namely buyers with h=0. 
In the model, it is therefore possible that a buyer can 
become a seller and vice versa. Indeed, a buyer becomes a 
seller after buying another house.5 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of 
reference is the homeownership market rather than the 
rental market. In this way, if a contract is legally binding 
(as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the 
circumstances preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and 
distinct contractual relationship is set up. In matching 
model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a 
specific buyer-seller match does not exist. As a result, the 
value of an occupied home for a seller is simply given by 
the selling price and, therefore, the expected values of a 
vacant house (V) and of finding a house (H) are the 
following:6 
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 In Leung and Zhang (2011), the equilibrium is in fact 
determined by a system of three equations in three unknowns, 
where the value of seller, the value of buyer and the house price 
depend on market tightness. As a result, with a fixed entry value 
for the buyers and a fixed number of sellers, they first solve the 
market tightness, and then the seller value and the house price. 
Indeed, also in Genesove and Han (2010) there is a constant 
value for the buyer’s search and an infinite supply of buyers, 
thus assuming that buyers can choose among a large number of 
markets, while sellers are tied to a specific market. 
5
 As will be clear later, buyers get utility from the house. Hence, 
on the one hand, buyers may have incentive for buying second 
home; on the other hand, however, it is not optimal for the buyer 
to sell before buying (second home) because the utility flows 
will be zero. 
6
 Time is continuous; individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely 
and discount future payoffs at the exogenous interest rate r > 0. 
As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to 
the stationary state in which the values of the variables are not 
subject to further changes over time. 
                ( ) [ ]VPθqarV −⋅+−=                         [1] 
     ( ) [ ]PHxθgerH −−⋅+−=                  [2] 
where θ≡v/b is the “overall” housing market tightness 
from the sellers’ standpoint; while q(θ) and g(θ) are, 
respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of filling a 
vacant house and of finding a home. The standard 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale in the matching 
function, m=m(v,b), is adopted (see Pissarides, 2000; 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), since it is also used in 
the recent search models of the housing market (see Diaz 
and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and 
Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and 
Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012). Hence, the properties of 
these functions are straightforward: ∂q(θ)/∂θ<0, 
∂g(θ)/∂θ>0, limθ→0 q(θ)=limθ→∞ g(θ)=∞, and limθ→∞ 
q(θ)=limθ→0 g(θ)=0. 7  Finally, the term a represents the 
cost flows sustained by sellers for the advertisement of 
vacancies; whereas, e represents the effort flows in 
monetary terms made by buyers to find and visit the 
largest possible number of houses. If a contract is 
stipulated, the buyer gets a linear benefit x from the 
property, which coincides with the value of the house 
(abandoning the home searching value) and pays the sale 
price P to the seller (who abandons the value of finding 
another buyer). The value of the house depends on the 
housing characteristics and it does not depend on the 
buyer's tastes.8 
3.1. The equilibrium 
In the housing market with search frictions, the 
endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously 
at equilibrium are market tightness (θ) and sale price (P). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, 
namely the “zero-profit” or “free-entry” condition, 
normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 
2000) yields the first key relationship of the model, in 
which market tensions are a positive function of price. In 
fact, using the condition V=0 in [1], we obtain: 
                ( ) ( ) P/aθqθqa/P 1 =⇒= −                   [3] 
with ∂θ/∂P>0, since 1/q(θ) is increasing in θ. This 
positive relationship is very intuitive: in fact, if the price 
increases, more vacant houses will be on the market. 
Instead, the generalised Nash bargaining solution, 
usually used for decentralised markets, allows the sale 
price P to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of 
surplus deriving from a successful match. The surplus is 
defined as the sum of the seller’s and buyer’s value when 
the trade takes place, net of the respective external 
options, i.e. the value of continuing to search, namely 
Surplus = (P – V) + (x – P – H) = x – H 
The price is then obtained by solving the following 
optimisation condition (recall that in equilibrium V=0): 
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 By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite 
tightness, i.e. 0<θ<∞, since for θ=0 the vacancies are always 
filled, whereas for θ=∞ the home-seekers immediately find a 
vacant house. 
8
 Also in Albrecht et al. (2007) and Leung and Zhang (2011) the 
value of the house is independent of agent types. Intuitively, the 
value of the house, and thus the buyer’s benefit, can be higher or 
lower according to the mix of desired and undesidered housing 
characteristics. 
( ) ( ){ }γ1γ PHxVP argmaxP −−−⋅−= ( )HxγP −⋅=⇒  
where 0<γ<1 is the share of bargaining power of sellers.  
Entering into a contractual agreement obviously implies 
that the surplus is always positive, i.e. x>H, for all θ. This 
realistic condition on the buyers’ side also ensures that the 
price is positive. Simple manipulations yield the equation 
for the selling price: 
                      
( )
( ) ( )γ1θgr
erxγP
−⋅+
+⋅
=
                        
[4] 
as market tensions increase, the probability of finding a 
home increases, and the sale price decreases; hence, we 
obtain the second key relationship of the model: ∂θ/∂P<0. 
In short, if the market tightness increases, the effect of the 
well-known congestion externalities on the demand side 
(see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price. 
Given the properties of the matching probabilities, it is 
straightforward to obtain from equation [3] that when P 
tends to zero (infinity), θ tends to zero (infinity), since 
q(θ) tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of equation [4], with positive intercept, i.e. 
limθ→0 P=γ·(x+e/r), and the fact that the selling price is 
always positive, only one long term equilibrium deriving 
from the intersection of the two curves exists in the model 
(see Figure 1 point A). 
Fig. 1. Equilibrium price and market tightness 
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3.2. Closing the model 
The optimal number of houses per capita h is obtained 
by the maximisation of the expected overall profit, namely 
the profit arising from the sale of all vacant houses on the 
market. Since the value of an occupied home for a seller is 
simply given by the selling price, the expected overall 
profit to maximise is the following: 
{ } ( ) P1hrΠmaxh ⋅−= ( ) 0θP/1hP
0
=∂∂⋅−+⇒
<
321
                                                          
              
( ) 0
θP/
P1h >





∂∂
−=−                     [5] 
An increase in vacant houses on the market, in fact, 
reduces the selling price. It follows that the number of 
houses on the market, (h – 1), is always positive, namely 
the number of houses held by sellers, h, is always higher 
than 1.
 
Eventually, in order to close the model, we normalise 
the population in the housing market to the unit, 1=s+b, 
i.e. a person is either a seller or a buyer, but not both, at 
any point in time. As a result, given the equilibrium value 
of market tightness and price, P* and θ*, we find the 
optimal number of houses per capita h=h(P,θ), and by 
using the definition of market tightness, θ*≡v/b, we obtain 
the stock of sellers and buyers. Hence, the free-entry 
condition ensures that the transition process from seller 
(buyer) to buyer (seller) comes to an end. Note that the 
margin between being a seller and a buyer is represented 
by the threshold value h=2. Hence, the key dynamics of 
the model is the transition between buyers and sellers who 
hold two houses. Precisely, the steady state condition 
which ensures that the share of buyers and sellers (who 
hold two houses) is constant over time is simply given by: 
     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) b
s
θq
θg
sθqbθg0b =⇒⋅=⋅⇒=&         [6] 
given the properties of the matching function which 
implies a close relation between g(θ) and q(θ), namely 
g(θ)=q(θ)·θ, the steady state condition is implicitly 
defined by the market tightness definition: θ≡(h – 1)·s/b is 
in facy equal to θ≡s/b for h=2. 
3.3. The trade-off between house prices and 
time-on-the-market 
The free-entry condition implies a trade-off between the 
housing price and the speed of sale for the seller. In fact, 
with a probability of filling a vacant house of q(θ), the 
expected time-on-the-market is 1/ q(θ). As a result, from 
[3] there is a positive correlation between housing price 
and the time-on-the-market, since a higher price requires a 
longer time to sell a house (as pointed out by Leung, 
Leong and Chan, 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and 
Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011). 
Indeed, by combining equations [3] and [4], this model 
is able to reproduce the observed joint behaviour of prices 
and time-on-the-market: in fact, the house with a higher 
selling price has a longer time on the market (see equation 
[3]), but, ceteris paribus, as shown by equation [4], the 
longer the time-on-the-market the lower the sale price (see 
Krainer, 2001; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and 
Zhang, 2011; Diaz and Jerez, 2009), since both 1/ q(θ) and 
g(θ) are increasing in θ. Consequently, the first 
proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 1: The standard matching model extended 
to the housing market is able to mimic the trade-off 
between selling price and time-on-the-market. 
3.4. Matching function and trading volume 
The matching function gives the number of matches 
formed per unit of time, given the number of vacant 
houses and the share of home seekers in the market. 
Hence, it gives the number of contracts traded during a 
given period, i.e. the trading volume for a given period. 
Obviously, an increase in the two arguments vacant 
houses and buyers increases the matching rate: 
∂m(v,b)/∂v>0; ∂m(v,b)/∂b>0. This, in turn, implies a 
positive effect on both the matching probabilities since 
q(θ)=m(v,b) / v and g(θ)=m(v,b) / b. 
However, it is quite clear that v and b have a further 
effect on q(θ) and g(θ), respectively. Precisely, an increase 
in the share of sellers (vacant houses) reduces the 
probability of filling a vacant house; whereas, an increase 
in the share of buyers reduces the probability of finding a 
home. Therefore, by using the two key equilibrium 
conditions, namely equations [3] and [4], we find a 
positive correlation between house prices and trading 
volume. From equation [3], in fact, a decrease in q(θ) 
implies an increase in selling price; whereas, from 
equation [4], a decrease in g(θ) causes an increase in 
selling price. Note that also this result derives from the 
direct relationship between house price and market 
tightness. 
Therefore, the model can also explain the positive 
relationship between housing price and trading volume, 
since an increase in the share of buyers and sellers 
increases both the selling price and the matching rate. This 
theoretical result is in line with the empirical works of 
Fisher et al. (2003) and Leung, Lau and Leong (2002). 
Therefore, it can be summarized in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2: In the baseline matching model of the 
housing market we can find a positive correlation between 
house prices and trading volume. 
3.5. Number of houses per capita and price 
dispersion 
From the maximisation of the expected overall profit, 
we get a unique (optimal) value of houses per capita h. In 
the real world, however, the number of houses per capita 
is not the same among sellers / housing markets. Indeed, it 
also depends on external factors as legacies, business 
cycle, property tax, location, etc., thus varying according 
to the housing market taken into account. 
Thus, we assume that the number of houses per capita 
ranges between 2 and a maximum exogenous value n, i.e. 
2 ≤ h ≤ n. It follows that the number of vacant houses on 
the market is different according to the value of n:9 
( )∑
=
−⋅
−
=
n
2h
1h
1n
s
v      [7] 
As a result, different equilibrium values of market 
tightness and price are obtained for different values of n. 
Indeed, a market with a larger number of sellers and/or 
vacant houses will have in equilibrium a higher value of 
market tightness; while, the opposite is true in the case of 
a market with a lower number of sellers/vacancies. In 
short, the two markets differ only with reference to the 
number of houses per capita. Therefore, housing prices 
would be different even for identical or similar houses, i.e. 
houses which have identical or similar housing 
characteristics and thus give the same buyers’ benefit x. 
Thus, the following proposition applies: 
Proposition 3: Price dispersion exists in the basic 
matching model only assuming a different number of 
houses per capita in the housing market. 
4. Conclusions 
The Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised 
framework of exchange with important search and matching 
frictions. Furthermore, three basic facts have been repeatedly 
reported by empirical studies: 1) the variance in house prices 
cannot be completely attributed to the heterogeneous nature of 
real estate and the residual price volatility is empirically non 
negligible; 2) the positive relationship between housing price and 
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 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the share of sellers 
does not vary across h, namely s(h) = s/(n – 1), for all h. 
the number of contracts traded during a given period (the trading 
volume); 3) the trade-off between housing price and the speed of 
sale for the seller. This theoretical paper shows that the 
behaviour of housing markets, reflected in the above empirical 
findings, can be addressed by the standard matching framework 
à la Mortensen-Pissarides without any significant deviation from 
the baseline model. 
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